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Being the Curriculum
Alyssa Hillary Zisk

I

t’s late January 2018, the start of the spring semester, and the journal ‘club’
for my neuroscience program is focusing on developmental disabilities.
The purpose is to have the neuroscience graduate students engage with
peer-reviewed academic articles, discussing them together, and the topics
rotate each semester. Since this ‘club’ is also a class, the first few weeks often
consist of longer presentations introducing the topics. This semester, we’re
going to start with introductory presentations for a few different disabilities:
one chromosomal, one single-mutation, and one with complex genetics
(thankfully not fully known—right now, that knowledge would be used for
eugenics). The professor running the class will bring outside experts into our
class to give these presentations for Down syndrome and for Rett syndrome.
He asks me if I want to give the presentation for autism, knowing that I’m
autistic.
Do I want to? It’s complicated.
On one hand, I wouldn’t be the first student to give this kind of introductory
presentation, in lieu of presenting on a single paper. One of my classmates
spoke about Parkinson’s. She was asked because she’d been a physical
therapist for people with Parkinson’s, not because she had it herself.
Somehow, I don’t think these are quite the same.
On another hand, I’ll be on display as the curriculum if I give this
presentation. I use augmentative and alternative communication part time,
because I can speak some of the time but not all of the time. That’s not the
kind of accommodation that can actually be kept private. I could theoretically
use my text-to-speech tools for class participation as needed without telling
anyone why. My needs still wouldn’t be private, just the reason for them.
However, in practice my classmates do in fact know I’m autistic. I’ll be on
display as an example of the neurotype we’re discussing. (Would leaving
someone else to give the presentation change that, once the professor
decided autism would be one of the three examples at the start of the
semester?)
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On an imaginary third hand, the hand that wins the day: I want nothing to
do with sitting through the presentation most ‘autism experts’ would give.
Thank you, no. If I don’t give this presentation or get excused from the day,
then there’s a very real chance of my conspicuously and defiantly throwing
myself into a wall . . . again (Hillary 2019b). I am a person, now, autistically, in
your classroom and in your conference hall, while neuronormative experts
discuss “optimal outcomes” and “loss of diagnosis” as if they were the same
thing. At the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, I was not given the
opportunity to be a speaker. When these assumptions were spoken as fact,
I took my natural stimming, which can include bouncing off the walls, up a
notch—instead of gently bouncing my back against the wall, I threw myself
hard enough for the vibrations to be felt near the stage from the back of the
auditorium where I was standing, repeatedly.
But a flat stretch of wall is a bit harder to find in our conference room turned
classroom than it was at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. And
even if I manage not to attend the hypothetical presentation by someone
else . . . my classmates will still attend. What will they internalize? I don’t
want to know, but I won’t escape finding out: I’m already out as Autistic. After
whatever presentation someone else could give, I will still be out as Autistic,
and my classmates will have internalized . . . something . . . about what that
means. Will they decide I’m unlike their understanding of autism and thus
Not Really Autistic, or that I am like their understanding of autism and
therefore Too Disabled To Understand? I don’t want to know that, either.
So, it’s time to go be the curriculum. What do I want a bunch of neuroscience
students to know about autism, that fits in an introductory presentation?
How do I talk about the very real differences, about a very real experience
of disability, in a way that my classmates trained in neuroscience, often
trending more towards basic biology than I do, won’t decide they need to
therapize me in class? And yes, it’s a concern. At my orientation for this PhD
program, I had a professor tell me, “no flapping.” (Obviously, I didn’t listen.
I typed back, “yes flapping!”’ and flapped more.) How do I give knowledge
that a neuroscience class will interpret as sensible science, without either
continuing the systemic epistemic violence of ignoring autistic people as
knowers (Ymous et al., 2020) or making a self-narrating zoo exhibit of myself
(Sinclair, 2005)? Also: why is it my job to walk this tightrope? What is this
tightrope doing in science to begin with?
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I tell them about models of disability, including not only the medical model
but also the scientific model (Gosling, 2008), because my classmates are
scientists. They need to know pushing for technological changes to our
bodyminds is not, in fact, a neutral position doing only good.
I tell them about language and autism: not how our speech and language are
supposedly “wrong,” but how it works. Here is hyperlexia, which nominally
just means early, self-taught reading. In practice, hyperlexic people are
almost always autistic. Here is echolalic communication, where people
re-use relevant quotes (or parts of quotes) to communicate. Echolalic
communication is not an oxymoron. It’s part of gestalt language acquisition
(Manning & Katz, 1989), it’s not unique to autism (Peters, 1977), and it works,
much the same way non-echolalic communication does (Prizant & Duchan
1981; Prizant & Rydell, 1984). This isn’t news; autistic people could have told
you this if you asked, and these references are older than I am!
The neurological findings related to autism are the slides I go through
fastest. Yes, this is a neuroscience course. No, this isn’t what I actually care
that my classmates learn. I need them to know that exclusion is a bigger
problem, that dehumanization is a bigger problem, than anything our brains
are doing differently. I need them to know that social issues occur in a social
environment, aren’t a problem located within a single person, are related to
neurotypical peers recognizing quickly that we are different and deciding
that they don’t want to interact with us (Morrison et al., 2019; Sasson et al.,
2017).
I need them to know: if you’re going to do autism research, while
understanding how autistic people actually work is useful, it’s not the most
pressing concern. Instead, the most immediate need is for you to remember
that we are human people who do things for human reasons, and to be wary
of building on work from people who literally said we weren’t people in the
psychological sense (Chance, 1974). We count as people (Gernsbacher, 2007).
If neurotypical cognition tends to work one way, and autistic cognition
tends to work another way, it’s not correct to call the neurotypical way “how
human cognition works.” Because fun fact: several neurocognitive quirks we
learned about in our degree are actually quirks of neurotypical cognition, not
of human cognition in general, and we were not taught this in class.
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I learned elsewhere that the McGurk effect, where mismatches between
visual and auditory cues can lead to a person ‘hearing’ a sound other than
the one that was made, is reduced in autistic people (Feng et al., 2021), years
after I was the only person in my neuroscience class the effect didn’t work
for. (And yes, the researchers noting that it’s a weaker effect in autism are
framing this as a deficit. Even though the effect being weaker means we’re
more likely to hear the sound that was actually produced. Make it make
sense, please.)
I learned elsewhere that autistic people are, effectively, harder to bribe
(though this is somehow a theory of mind deficit?) (Hu et al., 2021). I learned
elsewhere that Weber’s “law,” about the smallest difference most people
can perceive between stimuli, is not actually a law because it doesn’t hold
for autistic people (Hadad & Schwartz, 2019). One could argue that the
discussions of how these processes actually work for autistic people do
belong in a course on autism, or in a course on neurodivergent psychology.
However, the failure to specify that the way these processes generally work
for neurotypical people is, in fact, neurotypical psychology rather than
human psychology excludes neurodivergent people from “how cognition
works.”
Human cognition doesn’t all work one way. Researchers taking their
intuitions about their own cognition (our own cognition), using their
introspective understandings of how they think and perceive (our
introspective understandings of how we think and perceive) to guide
hypotheses of how cognition and perception might work is, I think, a
reasonable thing. I even do it: my experiences of thinking without visual
mental imagery guide my guesses about how cognition without visual
mental imagery, or aphantasiac cognition, might work in general. The use
of intuition is not the source of the problem. The problems come from a
combination of factors:
• The researchers who make hypotheses about cognition based on this
introspective intuition are usually neurotypical.
• Neurodivergent people face barriers to researching neurodivergent
psychology (when neurotypical people get to research neurotypical
psychology without issue).
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• Neuronormative intuitions are prioritized over neurodivergent ones,
even about how neurodivergent cognition works.
See also: arguments about the reality and importance of visual mental
imagery. It turns out some people have it and some don’t, but people really
wanted to show that cognition either requires mental imagery. So am I, an
aphantasiac person, merely executing a program and not thinking, as in
Searle’s thought experiment (1980)?
I know different minds work differently. As an autistic, aphantasiac teacher,
I try to keep this in mind. But do others remember that my mind exists (do
they believe my mind really, truly, exists as a mind?) as they teach about how
minds work? Yergeau says they’re getting used to not existing, in rhetoric
(2013). I’m not convinced I exist either, in neuroscience. Do I have to exist, to
be the curriculum?
Author’s Note: The presentation took place one semester later than the main
events of “Am I the Curriculum?” (Hillary 2019a), which is not needed to
understand this piece but does address similar themes. The follow-up events
to “Am I the Curriculum?,” however, largely occur after the main events of this
paper. Reflections on a variety of systemically awkward experiences in my
neuroscience PhD program continue to the present.
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